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Coopetitive environments (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996) are characterized by 
situations where firms simultaneously compete and cooperate with competitors. Such 
situations impede the generation of proprietary and discretionary learning, by forcing 
competitors to selectively share critical knowledge about their assets (Baumard, 
2008). Coopetition can arise from partial or incomplete interest into a rival’s domain, 
yet not requiring a full entry or deployment in the latter. Dagnino and Padula (2009) 
hence note that coopetition is not restricted to situations of simultaneous cooperation 
and competition, but rather extends to every form of strategic interdependency, where 
partially congruent and divergent interests need to be managed simultaneously. How 
do they differ from more traditional “collective strategies”  (Hawley, 1950; Astley 
and Fombrun, 1983)? 
 
Whilst collective strategies are temporary arrangements that increase the chance of 
success of previously or geographically competitive firms, coopetition translates in 
more durable form of inescapable coexistence. In order to distinguish between the 
forms of dependency that links firms in such a fate, Astley and Fombrun (1983) have 
borrowed from Hawley (1950)’s work on the coexistence between species in a 
biotope to describe the forms of durable arrangements that maintain the flow of 
interactions between firms. They suggest that the dependence upon a shared resource 
(commensalism), the mutual and symmetric dependence on core assets (symbiotic 
relations), or the dependence of a smaller player upon an architecture generated by a 
large incumbent (parasitism) trigger different environmental configurations, such as 
federations or conglomerates.  
 
While mixed motives (Axelrod, 1984; Schelling, 1986) and knowledge exchange 
within inter-firm networks (Grandori & Neri, 1999) have been studied extensively, 
little attention has been given to strategies of learning that firms must deploy in order 
to be successful in a setting where they have to learn from, or learn with, a 
competitor. While coopetitive arrangements are not conditionally antagonistic, the 
learning that occurs in the midst of an agreement where copyright laws, industrial 
secrecy and non-disclosure agreements are the sole barriers to protect the firm’s 
discretion is often felt as an adverse experience (Baumard, 2008). “Adverse learning” 
is a term used in education sciences to describe learning that triggers anxiety, 
emotional blockage, phobias, and poor responses (Menec et alii, 1995). Studies focus 
on providing alternative learning strategies that would help students in adverse 
learning strategies to overcome such obstacles. Two streams of research, one coming 
from the works of Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1968) on associative learning, and one 
coming from the works of Piaget (1972) on participative learning have focused on 
human antagonistic learning. Skinner observed that further responses of a learner are 
much influenced by what follow them. In his experiments, Skinner also shows that 
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rats resist complete conditioning, and invent a behavior that does not respond 
mechanically to the stimulus. They adapt adversity by creating a routine that bypass 
the trick that has been designed to create an aversion (usually an electric shock), and 
still allows for accessing their food. Whereas Skinner’s theory of behavioral chain 
received harsh criticism, noticeably by Chomsky, Piaget’s theory of reciprocity in 
learning brought an in-depth understanding of adverse learning in childhood. Piaget 
did not focus on a stimulus-response scheme, but rather in understanding the forms 
and logic the child uses when faced with a lack of response, trying to assimilate and 
accommodate with contradictory or adverse inputs. For Piaget, the journey into 
learning the mechanisms of learning, from birth to childhood, is one of slow and 
gradient asymmetric gains. The child learns simultaneously to define who he or she is, 
constructing an ontology of being, while inventing and discovering the epistemology 
of his or her interactions.  
 
Economists and etiologists have also studied antagonistic learning. We will see in this 
chapter how unexpectedly parallel these studies were. Akerlof (1970), in his market 
for lemons, developed a seminal example of adverse learning in economic trade-off 
situation. He shows that buyers can engage in adverse selection, when facing 
antagonistic and uncertain learning settings (in his example, when buying an 
untrustworthy second-hand car). Lorenz (1966) in his study of animal and human 
aggression disclosed similar examples of reluctant and adverse learning, noticeably 
when animals must accommodate a non-cooperative partner in order to achieve a vital 
learning mechanism for food and reproduction. Hence, “unbalanced” or “adverse” 
learning is inherent to most human and animal activities, but did not receive adequate 
attention by management and strategy scholars. 
 
Nevertheless, unbalanced learning in coopetitive dealing has gained a worldwide 
momentum with the rise of compensation mechanisms, involving for instance the 
retrocession of know-how or R&D capabilities to gain access to emerging markets. 
The objective of this chapter is to explore the learning strategies that can be deployed 
by firms in coopetitive configurations with no other choice than deploying an 
“adverse learning” mechanism to reach their customers through cooperation with their 
competitors. After exploring the mechanisms of asymmetric learning in a first section, 
the chapter adopts an ecological perspective (Hawley, 1950) in drawing parallels 
between animal organization and groups of firms in gaining a strategic advantage 
through asymmetric learning.  
 
Asymmetric learning 
Coopetitive situations are similar to settings described by Akerlof (1970) in his 
‘market for lemons’: two parties are seeking to get the most of their interaction, 
seeking cooperation to reduce information asymmetries, while engaging in 
competition to get the most out of the deal. In Akerlof’s seminal example, the market 
for used cars would diminish, even to the point of collapsing, because the fear created 
in the buyer by the information asymmetry reaches the point of preferring to pay 
more, for a new car and less uncertainty. In such a double bind context, the buyer of 
the ‘lemon’ will try everything he or she can to reduce the information asymmetry, by 
means of trust enabling, seduction, and eventual intelligence gathering from fellow 
buyers who visited the same shop. Unfortunately, as he or she soon discovers, buying 
a used car is a situation where the moral hazard is inescapable, for the asymmetry 
ultimately plays in favor of the seller.  
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Adequate learning strategies can reduce the information asymmetries between the two 
parties. As Stigler suggested (1961:224), partners in such adverse selection scheme, 
often rely on the reputation of the other party, coping the fact that they cannot afford 
or access the search for complete information on the correct price. As Stigler puts it: 
“Ignorance is like subzero weather: by a sufficient expenditure its effects upon people 
can be kept within tolerable or even comfortable bounds, but it would be wholly 
uneconomic entirely to eliminate all its effects” (op. cit., p. 224). The problem with 
coopetitive situations is that both parties mirror each other, being simultaneously 
reciprocal buyers and sellers. They need to unveil minimum level information to 
engage in cooperation, while keeping from sight a sufficient level of information to 
preserve their competitive stance. In other words, both parties need to “sell” part of 
their information to the other party, while at the same time “buy” themselves some 
discretionary and competitive knowledge on their partner in order to be able to 
eventually compete, later or sooner. They are symmetrically ignorant of the other’s 
actual performance, not knowing if they are in a situation of “lemon for lemon” or 
“gold for gold”. This situation is similar to an employer meeting a prospective 
employee: the applicant does not know if the firm is a lemon or a paradise; the 
employer does not know if the applicant is a lemon or a world-class. Spence (1973) 
proposed a specific learning strategy for such two partially ignorant parties 
cooperating in a competitive situation. He named it “signaling”. Previous experience 
has taught employers that higher education in their employees return higher profits, 
while applicants know that firms that can afford better trained professionals usually 
pay them higher and provide better workplaces. Of course, the intrinsic value of the 
higher education, and likewise, the intrinsic value of the workplace, does not prevent 
the model to work. In other words, escaping information asymmetry can be achieved 
through games of convention (Lewis, 1969). The application’s education does not 
possess a known price, even if it had a cost. Its appreciation is a social convention, 
and usually labeled as such, e.g. “Ivy League”. The firm’s reputation either does not 
come with a price, but much evidence can be found in “precedents”, a term used by 
Lewis to denote the existence of common knowledge shared by the parties on the 
state of the social convention.  
 
A convention is a highly ambiguous approximate of a price. In the market for lemons, 
Akerlof (1970) puts a buyer in the position of choosing between prices for a lemon, or 
walk away, and eventually buy a new car. In most coopetitive situations, the choice to 
stay or go does not come with a price. If there are prices, they are so disperse in the 
intertwined implications of their collateral effects on future cooperation and 
competition, that even Stigler’s concept of “dispersion” would not capture the 
dilemma facing the coopetitive partners. As a consequence, partners in coopetition 
trade “conventions” that are crafted for the purpose of trying to stay in the game, 
while not chasing away the partner from its cooperative predisposition. An adequate 
etiological myth to illustrate such coopetitive strategies might be found in Hesiod’s 
Theogony. Hesiod relates how Greeks tricked Zeus when faced between the choice of 
their self-starvation and satisfying the God’s demand. Prometheus assembled a pack 
of bones and fat made of the sacrificial animal, keeping the meat aside, hence 
cooperating the Gods, while not totally betraying them. 
 
An ecological perspective 
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What prevents Prometheus to inform Zeus that his people are lacking food is not 
malignity, but fear. As Mariani (2007) showed in his analysis of Italian opera houses 
consortium, coopetition is rarely a deliberate situation desired by partners. It is more 
likely to be emergent and somewhat undesired. When thrown into coopetition, firms 
face a change in their ecological arrangements with other firms that can be compared 
to a change of biological equilibrium in a living organism, or in nature. Several 
authors have borrowed from biology and ecology to describe organizational 
phenomenon. McKelvey (1982) in Organizational Systematics borrows the principles 
of natural selection to try to apply them to populations of organizations. Nelson and 
Winter (1982) draw an analogy between organizational routines and genetic 
characteristics. For the latter, routines that match environmental conditions allow 
firms to survive, while firms failing to adopt adequate routines disappear. In the same 
perspective, Astley and Fombrun (1983) borrowed Hawley (1950)’s characterization 
of living organisms’ interactions within an ecosystem to describe interactions between 
firms, building extensively on concepts such as commensalism, antagonism, 
symbiosis, parasitism, etc. Hence, by seeking to explain how firms survive by 
drawing analogies with ecology, these authors have founded the primary stones of the 
study of strategic learning (Starbuck, Barnett and Baumard, 2008). However, loyal to 
a functionalist tradition, strategic management literature that has borrowed from 
ecology and biology has performed a discretionary selection, stopping the analogy at 
a mere description of interactions, and putting aside what in fact motivates the 
adoption of an antagonistic behavior rather than a cooperative one. 
 
Studies of cooperation and competition, by large, have put too much emphasis on 
intent and the deliberate nature of competitive configurations. Even the work of 
Astley and Fombrun (1983) that intensively borrows from Amos Hawley (1950) study 
of biotic communities, fails to underline the instinctive and “natural” organization of 
those interactions. In fact, the authors state that their analysis “highlights the 
importance of collective, as opposed to individual, forms of organizational 
adaptation” (p. 578) as to suggest the importance of “collective strategy: the joint 
mobilization of resources and formulation of action within collectivities of 
organization” (ibid.). It is unfortunate that organizational theory only borrowed the 
surfacing and salient aspects of ethology and biology, for much of the most 
interesting part of this body of science lies at the very low level of animal behavior in 
face of uncertainty and ambiguity (Burkhardt, 2005).  
 
In particular, Lorenz (1966) introduced four different dimensions in attempt of 
explaining animal behavior: the immediate response to a stimulus, which could be 
compared to a competitive reaction such as a retaliation; the inherent and 
programmed behavior (ontogenetic), which can be compared to the works of 
population ecology; the mimetic and homothetic behaviors, which are routed both in 
genetic inheritance and imitation, which can be compared to institutionalism; and 
finally, the functional adaptation, which is learned from experiencing with other 
species and the natural environment, and which seems to have attracted most of the 
attention from the management literature (Astley and Fombrun, 1983).  
 
Lorenz defended the idea that these four dimensions of behavior continuously interact 
while an animal is experiencing a large variety of events and learning challenges. 
Although Lorenz’s theory of instinctive behavior has been partially invalidated by 
early critics (Lehrman, 1953), he was the first to underline that the failure of human 
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strategic learning does not lies in the lack of learning abilities, but on the contrary, 
and contrary to animals, in the excess of learning functions that humans are 
conducting. Finally, animals live in coopetitive settings. Cooperation, either 
symbiotic, parasitic or commensalist is a necessity, not a choice. Likewise, 
competition, that happens simultaneously, and eventually among the same species, is 
also a vital component for feeding and their social organization (Mesterton-Gibbons 
and Adams, 1998). Therefore, animals need to adapt, whether the context being one 
of cooperation or competition.  Bence (1986) notes that some species have developed 
skills in “antagonistic learning”, i.e. adopting a behavior that precludes feeding 
efficiently on more than one type of prey at a time. He observes that mosquito fishes 
decrease their feeding rate as they increase attack specialization on profitable prey. 
Krane and Wagner (1975), however, showed that a modification of such a behavior 
can be “imprinted”, to use a Lorenz’s term, on animals by associating an electric 
shock with a specialized food (in that case saccharin with rats). Yet, the Charles 
River’s rats defy theorization by being able to cooperate with the experimenters, 
hence accessing their food, even with the burden of an adverse and antagonistic 
learning. Faced with contradictory choices, animals do engage in learning behaviors 
that are adverse to their objectives, and manage cooperation and competition 
simultaneously. The question rose by such an observation: why do theorizations of 
coopetition do not assume that human beings can do just the same?  
 
Cooperating and competing at the same time 
 
Like Spence’s (1973) applicants for a job, animals have an intensive use of 
“signaling” to reduce informational asymmetries, discourage aggression, or engage in 
courtship. This “signaling” activity is highly conventional, ceremonial and codified 
(Lorenz, 1966). In the event of courtship that Lorenz describes as a simultaneous 
activity of aggression animals also use what Stiglitz (1975) has labeled as 
“screening”. Screening is a technique used by an economic agent, trying to reduce an 
informational asymmetry, to extract discretionary information from another. Within a 
group of similar job applicants, an employer has a keen interest of finding out who are 
the most qualified, without letting them know that he is after this information. In a 
situation of coopetition, a firm is in a similar situation. It has a strategic interest to 
“screen” partners, among which it competes and cooperates, without letting them now 
that such a screening is taking place. Animals have a very similar problem when they 
try to mate, and this is largely due to social conventions and perceptions of hierarchy 
(Lorenz, 1966). Lorenz observed that animals resort to “redirected activity” when 
provoked and in the incapacity of conducting a retaliation on the animal originating 
the aggression. Hence, they start a very aggressive move towards the provocateur, 
drop it at the last minute, and redirect their aggression on the closest neighbor. This 
redirection of aggression has two functions: first, it informs the provocateur that its 
offense has been acknowledged, and second, it provides a simultaneous “screening” 
by reasserting the hierarchy of the dominant male in the social structure.  Similar 
behaviors have been observed in human competitive signaling among populations of 
salesmen (DePaulo, 1988) and in product announcements from firms trying to “bluff” 
the competition (Robertson et al, 1995). In both instances, the bluff signaling has two 
purposes: first, to deceit the receiver in believing in the sender’s superiority 
(maintaining or enacting an information asymmetry), and simultaneously, to inform 
the receiver that the firm may engage in an irreversible move if the current 
equilibrium would come to be threatened (screening).  
 6 
 
What the animal is also doing when redirecting its aggression to its closest neighbor is 
to take a “hint” at the status of both its cooperative and competitive perception within 
its social group (Lorenz, 1966). Doing so, a much larger risk is involved in trying to 
solve both problems at the same time. If the provocateur, most likely a female during 
mating season, stands in the way, this unwanted aggression, on both sides, even if 
initiated by one of the parties, will terminate any prospects of future relations. If the 
aggression is successfully redirected, but unsuccessful, the dominant male looses its 
status within the group, and consequently, both prospects of cooperation (in this case, 
mating) and competition (in this case group dominance) are lost. This is a high level 
of risk for just taking a “hint”, and as Schilling noted: “Taking a hint is fundamentally 
different from deciphering a formal communication or solving a mathematical 
problem; it involves discovering a message that has been planted within a context by 
someone who thinks he shares with the recipient certain impressions or associations. 
One cannot, without empirical evidence, deduce what understandings can be 
perceived in a nonzero-sum game of maneuver any more than one can prove, by 
purely formal deduction, that a particular joke is bound to be funny” (Schelling, 1960: 
163-164). Lorenz or Parker et al. (1999)’s gorillas are in a very similar situation: a 
provocation has been deliberately thrown to call for his attention; but the signal 
carries simultaneously several meaning, and several intents. It is directed as much as 
its attention, than at the attention of the social group. Taking a “hint” either 
cooperatively or competitively are not available options. The “hint” must be obtained 
while managing simultaneously a competitive (with the social group, and the 
provocateur to assert its legitimacy) and coopetitive relation (with the provocateur to 
maintain the bound, and the social group to assert belonging the pack).  
 
Attention Sharing and the Dilemma of Coopetitive Stance 
 
Managing simultaneously a cooperation and competition increases the problems of 
attention and sense making in managing competitive dynamics. Ocasio (1997) 
defended the idea that firm behavior is mostly the result of how firms channel and 
distribute their attention. Although Ocasio is more interested in revisiting Simon’s 
behavioral theory of the firm by proposing another limitation to human bounded 
rationality, he justly points out that managerial attention is situated, structurally 
distributed between tasks and limited in span and depth (see model Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Ocasio (1997)’s model of situated attention and firm behavior (P. 192) 
 
Ocasio (1997, 1995) opposes two perspectives on the effect of economic adversity. 
On one hand, he cites Kiesler and Sproull (1982) who advocated that failures of 
economic performance induces corrective actions, and on the other, the theory of 
threat-rigidity effects (Staw et al., 1981), which argues that adversity leads to more oil 
congealing, more control, and more ridigity. The author then suggests that both 
phenomena are simultaneous. Mimetic isomorphism brings repertories of responses 
that can rigidify the firm’s response to environmental adversity; while the same 
adversity triggers at the same time a higher amount of “paralleled” problemistic 
search. In other words, there is a trade-off between the attention given to maintaining 
group acceptance and conformity (mimetic isomorphism) and trying to get an 
advantage (problemistic search). Indeed, Ocasio teaches that executives have 
problems which are in nature very similar of gorillas’. One interesting twist of 
Occasio’s theory would be to analyze such double-bind effects by mirroring the 
situation of an organization A with an hypothetical organization B. The following 
diagram (Figure 2) has been drawn in this purpose, notwithstanding that its dyadic 
nature does not imply than more than two firms can be intertwined in the very same 
configurations. Both organizations are thus trying to maintain legitmacy to their 
respective strategic groups. Meanwhile, because of their coopetitive stance, they must 
reciprocally signal (Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1975) a fair behavior to their competitor-
partner. A missing element in Occasio’s model, however, is the role of the customer, 
who is likely to be ignorant  of the coopetitive nature of the goods he or she consumes 
(see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Signaling and Learning Behavior in Coopetition 
 
Although the customer is buying a “bundled” or “integrated” offer”, there is still an 
intensive rivalry between the involved organizations for grabbing their share of 
attention. Hence, both organizations are likely to compete for asymmetrical 
informational gains gathered in the privileged space they maintained with the 
customer, despite of the running coopetition. Customers found themselves in a 
situation quite similar of a buyer of a “lemon” (Akerlof, 1970): while they purchase 
the overall offer on the basis of the aggregator’s reputation, their selection of the 
respective components is an adverse selection, as they purchase the coopetitive offer 
not knowing the intrinsic performance of its various components.  
 
In Akerlof’s seminal example, both buyer and seller can eventually rely on their own 
examination of the car. Although engine performance greatly varies from make and 
Organization A Organization B 
Strategic Group 
(industry) 
Customer 
Coopetitive offer 
Competing for 
attention share 
Competing for 
attention share 
Signaling fair behavior 
Maintaining 
Legitimacy 
Maintaining 
Legitimacy 
Competing for asymmetrical informational gains 
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year, even with the same brand of car, general state of the car, and general aspect of 
pipes, carburetors, etc, can be thoroughly inspected. General knowledge is also 
available from word-of-mouth and specialist registries. Knowing that buyers could 
access external knowledge, classic car sellers may try to “obfuscate” evident 
liabilities in their cars. A well-known practice is to wax, blacken and shine engine 
components as to conceal the wariness of the mechanical pieces. The rise of 
electronic and software components, however, has render obfuscation more 
permissive, less detectable, to a point that can both challenge Akerlof’s theory and 
explain the sustainability of paradoxical configurations such as coopetitive 
agreements. 
 
Obfuscation is the concealment of meaning in communication by the use of placebic 
and neutrally functional capabilities to a technological set or chunk of knowledge. 
Obfuscation is not necessary driven by malevolent intents. Faced with 
incompleteness, indeterminacy, irrelevance and incommensurability, managers often 
rely to industry recipes that temporarily “obfuscate” their lack of responses (Spender, 
1989). For instance, a doctor can use such obfuscation in order to conceal the 
meaning of a difficult operation to an overly worrying patient. Linsley and Lawrence 
(2007) found large firms’ annual reports to display a very low readability level when 
it comes to communicating risks to the public opinion. Similarly, Bournois and Point 
(2006) found that commentary letters from CEOs in annual reports contain 
themselves a high level of obfuscation regarding imminent losses, future profits and 
confidence. Rutherford (2003) produces similar findings when he extensively studied 
the textual complexity of Operating and Financial Reviews (OFR). Kono (2006) sees 
in obfuscation a core mechanism of modern democracies. In his study of trade 
policies of 75 countries, Kono finds that democracy promotes “optimal obfuscation” 
by forcing policy makers to a more acute management of transparency, which mostly 
relies on sophisticated obfuscation of communications to trade partners.  
 
The use of obfuscation in strategic alliances rose steadily with the generalization of 
“obfuscated codes” in software development. Coping with a weak legal intellectual 
protection for software, many large software firms started to obfuscate their source 
codes before integrating them in commercial products, or when leading co-
developments with partners that could be, or become, competitors.  Obfuscation 
allows maintaining a paradoxical alliance by preventing opportunistic behavior in 
shared learning (Larsson et alii, 1998). Obfuscated codes allow software to run with 
the exact same performance than its non-obfuscated version. “Optimal obfuscation” 
using in international trade negotiations do not prevent commerce relations to grow in 
volume and profitability. They allow, however, sharing a critical know-how, such as 
an algorithm to fly a plane at a very low altitude, with a competitor; allowing this 
competitor to gain learning on low-altitude flights for improvement in other domains, 
such as aerodynamics, and without compromising the balance between cooperation 
and competition.  
 
Advances in learning require the concentration of knowledge on specific assets, as to 
develop rents or cumulate enough experience to take a market lead. Such learning 
curves consume large shares of companies’ R&D investments. Obfuscated sharing 
allows continuing to develop and gain knowledge rents. Advantageously, the use of 
obfuscating strategies does not imply that the sharing firm needs to impose causal 
ambiguity on itself. Causal ambiguity has been defined by Lippman and Rumelt 
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(1982) as a coincidental or deliberate retention of knowledge “concerning the nature 
of the causal connections between actions and results” which can include uncertainty 
“as to what factors are responsible for superior (or inferior) performance” (Lippman 
& Rumelt, 1982: 420). While causality cannot be established in an obfuscated code, 
its transformation is simply based on the addition of artificial and placebo complexity, 
that does not prevent the buyer to use the code, performs its application at the same 
level of performance, and eventually to inspect the obfuscated code. The following 
figure (3) shows two versions of the same code, obfuscated on the right, and non-
obfuscated on the left: 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A clean “non-obfuscated” code (left) and its obfuscated version (right) 
 
Obfuscation techniques were not developed collaboration in mind. The technique has 
a long history that began with the birth of Ancient societies. Detienne and Vernant 
(1991) have described how duplicity of meaning and deed constitutes the architecture 
of mêtis, know-how of cunning that allows Greek heroes to defeat their enemies by 
design, not brute force. More recently, Lin Foxhall (2007: 107) describes how olive 
tree growers in Ancient Greece, as to deter imitation, or conceal the real usage of their 
land to the jurors of their jurisdiction when in dispute with their neighbors, used 
obfuscation. Hence, narrative obfuscation was a frequent usage in Ancient Greece, 
playing with a language that authorizes puns, word play and versatility of sense 
making.  While obfuscation has a long history, it never achieved the perfection that 
software technologies had brought to this technique; that is to say to achieve a perfect 
duality, a perfect dissociation between intelligibility and functional authenticity.  
        
Examples from the telecommunication and media industry 
 
In the previous paragraphs, we saw that signaling is essential to coopetitive 
collaboration as it reduces the mutual temptation for opportunistic behavior between 
the involved partners. Borrowing from ecology and ethology, we induced that 
excessive learning impedes the performance of coopetitive arrangements, because it 
increases tensions and antagonistic learning. Observing ape behavior, we inclined 
towards a proposition that “redirected activity” may play a central mechanism in 
avoiding direct confrontation between two firms in coopetitive dyad. Following 
Schelling (1960), we inferred that weathering out a problematic relation in a 
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coopetitive dyad involves “taking hints” on the competition; a deed impractical and 
hardly realizable with discretion. Investigating the need for discretion and distracting 
attention further, we learned from Ocasio (1997) that firms constantly arbitrate in a 
trade-off between conformity with the dyadic partner (mimetic isomorphism) and 
individualistic search. The question was then to find a solution to “share without 
sharing”, “cooperate without cooperating”, and “competing without competing”. We 
finally discovered that modern obfuscation techniques were used in Ancient Greece 
for this exact purpose between olive tree growers, forced to cooperate with other 
farmers, but protecting their farming techniques by obfuscating their disclosure using 
the versatility of the Greek language (Foxhall, 2007). In other words, obfuscation 
allows mediating destructive signaling by drowning antagonistic learning within a 
placebic set of sharable of information. 
 
Telecommunication is a coopetitive industry. The rise of digital technologies in its 
infrastructures and services production led the industry towards complex 
arrangements, with multi-level competition and cooperation at different layers of the 
service delivery. For example, Apple Inc is delivering digital musical pieces through 
its on-line digital stores ITunes. The revenue model of the on-line store is mimetic 
and symbiotic with the historical economic model of the music publishing industry. 
Apple Inc insured a proper signaling policy towards the Recording Industry 
Association (RIAA) by adopting a pricing structure that respects the Digital Rights 
Management, and the historical economic model of this industry. Although this 
precaution sent the right signal to the recording industry, Apple Inc rapidly collected 
“asymmetrical informational gains” (see figure 2) by captivating most of the attention 
share of the customer, and developing an in-depth understanding of consumer 
behavior that the Cupertino firm did not share with its “coopetitors” in the recording 
industry. Although the delivery system used by Apple seems transparent for its 
coopetitors, it is highly obfuscated. Algorithms used for the display of customer 
preferences and recommendation engines are proprietary to Apple Inc, and not shared 
with the recording industry. Even if the whole economic model is readable and 
understandable by the recording industry, the meaning of the change introduced by 
the system was inherently concealed to the recording industry, which in good faith 
pursued this deadly cooperation with the Cupertino firm. While the recording industry 
is steadily losing market shares in the 2003-2008 period, Apple Inc is gaining 
exceptional growth. Obfuscation created a long-term strategic advantage for the firm 
that grasped most of the attention share with the customers. 
 
Not all winning strategies imply the establishment of a symbiotic agreement with the 
“coopetitors”. New entrants can also adopt parasitism by stealing the attention share 
from the main incumbent, and developing the same strategy that we described about 
Apple Inc. The “LastFM” venture is an exemplar of such a strategy. LastFM is an 
Internet radio. Because it uses the right to emit without recording digital music, the 
firm has obfuscated one major legal backdrop in order to enter this coopetitive 
market. Pursuing a parasitic strategy, LastFM is both a website platform and a 
software component that self-installs within the ITunes platform. When installed, the 
software “listens” to music played by the user, and records its consumption of digital 
music on any support: on the computer itself, on the digital music player IPod, and on 
multiple supports. This practice has already been nicknamed by users as “scrobbling”.  
Scrobbling is the act of recording constantly one’s preferences as to re-use the 
accumulated learning in another functional environment. For instance, a user can go 
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hiking for many hours, listening to its portable music, and when returning home, 
connect its portable music player, such as an IPod, and upload the chronology of its 
listening, both to the ITunes software, and directly to the LastFM database. The 
LastFM software will then upload the entire library, and its evolution to its own 
central databases. Of course, once this library is present on LastFM server, the 
company can provide a “radio” that plays authors and composers present in the 
ITunes platform. But it can also do more. Because many customers are “scrobbling” 
and sending their accumulated learning to the LastFM platform, the firm accumulates 
their learning and can use sophisticated collaborative technologies to create a new 
learning available for each customer: A powerful recommendation engine that can 
help the customer extend its primary musical tastes to new authors and composers. 
LastFM strategy is an exemplar of the use of obfuscation to gain an asymmetric 
advantage in a coopetitive arrangement. Similarly to the trick played by Apple Inc on 
the recording industry, LastFM is implementing an obfuscated routine within the 
platform of its “coopetitor”: it delivers transparently a legal function (listing in a 
database what the customer listens), but beyond this placebo “façade”, pursues the 
creation of a valuable meaning, which at turn becomes the core of its economic 
model. After its significant success in grabbing attention share, LastFM was acquired 
by the CBS Corporation. Hence, it has become a core instrument of coopetition 
between the CBS group, owning and publishing contents, and the Apple platform, 
distributing those contents.  
 
Obfuscation is also a core mechanism in another firm at the center of a coopetitive 
ecosystem: Google from Mountain View, CA. By multiplying its listening to 
customer behavior at multiple points (search engine, electronic mail, electronic 
geographic software), the firm developed a convergent and obfuscated learning 
infrastructure, which allows to operate an antagonistic learning, usually not tolerated 
by users when transparent, and bring back the fruit of this learning directly in its 
economic model. When the customer has means to identify the obfuscation, the 
technology is indeed rejected. Although it has a superior performance to most built-in 
search engines, the Google Desktop solution never gain an according market share. 
The problem is that this application “calls home” frequently, i.e. repatriates its 
obfuscated learning for further exploitation to the main servers of the firm.  Although 
customers do not see and do not understand what learning is taking place, they can 
still detect that an unauthorized outgoing communication is taking, usually blocked by 
specialized software such as a firewall.  
 
“Obfuscated learning” and “obfuscated components” are not provided in disguise. 
They do not constitute a violation of the law. However, the sophistication of modern 
obfuscation techniques make it very improbable for a partner in a coopetitive 
arrangement to be certain that the announced and visible functionalities are truly the 
ones performed. Hence, like the gorilla who cannot decided if the invite is an 
aggression or a collaboration, firms are forced to “take a hint”, either by redirecting 
aggression as a means of signaling, or by blurring, or bluffing, the obfuscated learning 
that accompanies the collaboration. Such a case occurred when the “inhabitants” of 
Second Life, a large persistent virtual world where users develop replicas or 
phantasmagoric versions of reality, discovered that the owner of the company, Philip 
Rosedale, known as Philip Linden in the virtual world, was also a main component in 
the virtual world’s regulation. Second Life is a coopetitive environment, which 
organization and development is shared between its inhabitants (and customers of 
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Linden Labs) and Linden Labs themselves, who owns the architecture and provide the 
services. Originally, the virtual world started as an experiment, and little thought has 
been put in its democratic processes, for Second Life was nothing else than an 
entertaining platform. As the world grew, it absorbed most of the deviant behaviors of 
the real world, so that the owner of the platform, which is legally liable in the real 
world, started to impose regulation on behaviors. However, inhabitants compete as 
much as they cooperate in such a world. They compete for attractive parts of the land, 
such as isolated islands, like in the real world. They cooperate as the “life” of the 
virtual world depends on a minimal cooperation and game play. Linden Labs, with no 
doubt with the intent of “doing good” started to apply discretionary and obfuscated 
sanctions to deviant inhabitants who might have decided that laws “from the outside” 
could not be applied in a virtual and phantasmagoric world. As long as the various 
interventions were obfuscated, the virtual world continued to grow, with little 
disturbance of its precarious coopetitive equilibrium. But mistakes were made. And 
harmony was gone: “redirected aggression” took place in many forms: inhabitants 
started to own and run “independent press”, both in the virtual world and in the real 
world. Democratic rules were asked. A supplier of electronic voting systems from the 
real world was suggested in good faith by the Labs, but the inhabitants redirected 
most of their aggression on the supplier, and then, on the founder of the virtual world. 
Excessive discretion and lack of discretion both contributed to an unbalanced 
ecosystem, riddled with conflicts.  
 
In the three above examples, obfuscated learning serves the purpose of mitigating 
coopetition. In LastFM case study, the obfuscated learning allows the firm to benefit 
from the ITunes platform without infringing copyright laws, yet yielding its own 
learning grounded in another learning ecosystem. Interestingly, on LastFM own 
platform, the songs of the “discovered” new music artists can be purchased through 
other vendors, in direct competition with ITunes, but cannot be purchased back on the 
ITunes platform. Apple Inc introduced in September 2008 its own recommendation 
engine, but the latter has intrinsically a poorer performance as it sources its learning in 
its own closed ecosystem. The Second Life case study is different. Obfuscated 
learning was made explicit as the Linden Labs were struggling with a rapid growth a 
petty criminality in their virtual environment. Explicit and direct discretion was 
exerted, not without humor by for instance building a virtual jail inspired by the final 
chapter of Philip K. Dick’s Substance Death, i.e. a never-ending field where 
inhabitants are forced to run a virtual tractor until completion of their sanction. Here 
we discover that tolerance to obfuscated learning strategies by customers play a 
central role in maintaining a coopetitive environment perceived as well balanced and 
fair by users. Google Inc has known similar difficulties when customers groups 
claimed than a ten years archive of their learning was an exaggerated measure, and 
was not justified by the delivery of services. The firm from Mountain View accepted 
to revise its recording process, and subsequently moved its obfuscated learning 
strategies in other domains such as geo-location, the creation of its own Web browser 
where it can operates freely a various range of obfuscated learning devices.  
 
Towards a theory of obfuscated cooperation 
 
Coopetition is an emerging paradigm. The combination of globalization and 
commoditization forces firms to integrate more and more generic components from 
competitors in the assembly of their offers to customers. The quest for larger market 
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coverage also induces firms in sharing a coopetitive space facing a single customer, 
such as the ITunes platform. In our investigation, we compared coopetitive dyadic 
situations, such as a reciprocal adverse selection inspired by the works of Akerlof 
(1970), Spence (1973) and Stiglitz (1975). We first concluded that such a 
configuration would lead the coopetitive dyadic partners to deploy parallel learning 
mechanisms in order to obtain asymmetric learning gains “bypassing” their fair 
collaboration agreement with their coopetitors (Figure 2). Inspired by the practices of 
Ancient Greece olive tree growers (Foxhall, 2007), we then suggested that competing 
ad cooperating within the same learning system was possible if both learning devices 
were mutually obfuscated. Doing so, the coopetitive firm is still signaling a “fair 
behavior”, or at least a legal behavior, to other members of the coopetitive platform, 
but can at the same time build its own discretionary learning (see Figure 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Obfuscated learning in coopetitive spaces 
 
 
Several authors are proposed typologies of coopetitive strategies; noticeably Dagnino 
and Batista (2009) suggested to distinguish simple dyadic coopetition from complex 
network coopetition by differentiating the level of interfirm relation (macro, meso, 
micro) and respective gains in terms of knowledge and economic value. Likewise, we 
would like to propose several categories of learning strategies within a coopetitive 
framework. These categories do not represent a finding, but rather probable alleys of 
empirical research that may contribute to a more structured study of coopetitive 
management of growth and innovation.  
 
Mixed motive cooperation, benevolence and contrition (RSTL) 
The first generic learning strategy we propose is situated within the classic context of 
perfect competition, perfect information and mutual transparency behavior. Such 
contexts are traditional to laboratory experiments of game theorists. We call this 
strategy the “reciprocal symmetric transparent learning” (RSTL, see table 1 below). In 
such a context, market regulates competition (Clifton, 1977), and “players” 
accommodate their behavior in order to win over the cooperative dynamics. The 
 
Organization A Organization B 
Strategic Group 
(industry) 
Customer 
Coopetitive offer 
Competing for 
attention share 
Competing for 
attention share 
Signaling fair behavior 
Maintaining 
Legitimacy 
Maintaining 
Legitimacy 
Competing for asymmetrical informational gains 
Obfuscated 
Learning from B 
 
Obfuscated 
Learning from A 
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learning strategy is hence transparent, and it aims at obtaining from the partner, by 
the symmetric games of dissuasion, persuasion, and conviction, an expected behavior. 
 
When information circulates freely amongst partners, corrective actions are taken on 
the behavioral determinants of the interaction. Partners use signaling intensively 
(Spence, 1973; Robertson at al., 1995), but signals get easily jammed and 
misunderstood. Co-opetition hence heavily depends upon complex “tit for tat” 
strategies (Axelrod, 1984). When messages are misunderstood, partners correct them 
by adding generosity, for example by compensating a losing party once the deal has 
been won. Vice versa, a partner that has betrayed the fragile gentleman’s agreement 
of co-opetition can still engage in cooperation after being punished for his selfish 
behavior (Wu and Axelrod, 1995). Natural biotopes (Hawley, 1950) and animal packs 
(Lorenz, 1966) display similar learning strategies. They are, -- as Axelrod and Dion 
(1988) noted --, similarly used by nations, bats, birds and monkeys. 
 
Asymmetric Open Adverse Learning (AOAL) strategies 
 
In a context of a free information and perfect market, one can always walk away from 
an adverse situation. The expectation, or the inescapable constraint, of an on-going 
relationship can dramatically change the perspective. In the various examples we 
found in the literature, Charles’ River rats bend their aversion to shocks in order to 
continue feeding, Mosquito Fishes over-specializes their hunting strategy, despite 
individual risks, to protect their feeding regime. Organizations engage in similar 
antagonistic learning when they face an abrupt change in environmental trends, and 
decide to develop an adverse learning strategy within their core to accommodate the 
change. Intel pursued RISC architectures, despite its path dependency on previous 
architectures. Microsoft developed an Internet browser, despite its path dependency 
on static operating systems. Apple engaged in DRM-free distribution of digital music, 
despite its symbiotic economic model based on the defense of digital rights with the 
RIAA. These learning strategies are developed openly. Signaling is here used to 
reduce uncertainty in an adverse selection scheme (Stigler, 1961; Akerlof, 1970). 
When direct cooperation becomes too expensive, traditional “tit for tat” strategies 
become inefficient. Hence, firms engage in “contingent altruism”, i.e. trying to 
“discover ever more minimal conditions for the evolution of altruism” by selecting 
with parsimony the recipients of temporary favoritism (Hammond and Axelrod, 2006: 
333). In reviewing literature, we found similar behaviors within gorilla packs, when 
dominant males need to protect their competitive status in the pack, while 
simultaneously displaying a cooperative stance for mating purposes (Parker and al., 
1999). Firms like gorillas, “take a hint” (Schelling, 1960), and eventually use 
redirected aggression as both a signaling and intelligence gathering tactic. We named 
such strategies: “asymmetric open adverse learning” (AOAL). There is no 
concealment. Gorillas are rather explicit about their intents. They are conducted 
openly. As a matter of fact, visibility is key, for all players must clearly see their 
meaning in terms of direct and indirect reciprocity. They are swift and dynamic. 
Timing is key, for the gain in asymmetry will only be temporary, as the overall 
strategy is still pursuing the goal of maintaining the on-going and future relationships. 
The successful development of the ITunes platform and business model could well be 
the archetype of such a strategy.  
 
Obfuscated learning strategies: Adverse and Non-Adverse 
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Our observation of the co-existence of partially cooperative, and partially antagonistic 
partners around the ITunes platform suggests that obfuscation may actually play a 
major role in handling causal ambiguity and friction in a long-lasting co-opetition. 
Non-Adverse Obfuscated Learning (NAOL) has a long history in co-coopetitive 
settings. We found examples of obfuscated technical secrets of production in Ancient 
Greece (Foxhall, 2007), when olive tree growers needed to partially share access to 
their domains without sharing the specific asset of their regional trade. Spender 
(1989) gave similar examples of the use of industry-jargon, which allows industry 
peers to cooperate, even when working for competitors. More recently, several works 
have studied the role of obfuscation in creating “selective perceptual filtering” in 
company documents or official communications (Linsley et al, 2007).  
 
In a cooperative agreement, “non-adverse” obfuscation is used to prevent 
opportunistic behavior (Larsson and al., 1998). As the cooperation has no direct or 
readable reciprocity, for example in a fast evolving population of temporary partners, 
such as open source communities, partners may try to trigger “indirect reciprocity, 
(…) when benevolence to one agent increases the chance of receiving help from 
others” (Riolo and al., 2001: 441). NAOL strategies are indeed quite frequent. 
Algorithms for low altitude flying, which are essential to the growth of the airline 
construction industry, are shared between constructors under obfuscated algorithms. 
Obfuscation is not used with an aggressive purpose, but solely to allow the growth of 
new applications and exploration of new domains, while maintaining causal 
ambiguity (Lippman and Rupert, 1982). Technology allows for a co-opetition where 
“no memory of past encounters is required” (Riolo et al., 2001: 441). Hence, instead 
of adopting a “sociological” perspective on co-opetition, here the technology makes 
simultaneous cooperation and competition possible between partners who do not need 
to physically meet, who do not need to question their respective strategic intent, and 
finally, which defies the resource-based view of coopetitive agreements (see table 1, 
below). 
 
The fourth proposed generic learning strategy in a coopetitive environment is 
“competitive obfuscated adverse learning” (COAL). The purpose of obfuscation is 
here still to allow cooperating with a competitor without disclosing discretionary 
information and trade secret. But concealment also plays here a more competitive 
deed. We observed such a strategy when we analyze the growth of LastFM within the 
ITunes platform ecosystem. LastFM performs a better learning, and better 
recommendations according to users, than the embedded learning engine within its 
host’s platform. Contrary to other Internet radios based on collaborative filtering, such 
as Pandora, LastFM directly installs an obfuscated routine within the user’s ITunes 
platform, and hence, learns directly from his or her listening habits. This kind of 
articulation is not per say a parasitic behavior, as LastFM ends up extending the 
primary demand for digital music, by performing improved discovery, and returning 
demands to the ITunes commercial platform. On the contrary, LastFM performs an 
“optimal obfuscation” (Kono, 2006) allowing cooperation without compromising 
strategic independence (of both partners). The learning strategy that LastFM has to 
deploy is nevertheless adverse, as it is legally allowed to “borrow” consumer’s 
preferences with their agreement, but not allowed any recording or storage on its own 
platform. As in both Ancient Greece olive tree growing, and examples from Detienne 
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and Vernant (1991), the limit of deployment of such learning strategy lies in the social 
tolerance in obfuscation (see table 1, below). 
 
Generic Strategies Competition Cooperation Co-opetition 
RSTL 
Reciprocal Symmetric 
Transparent Learning 
 (Both parties learn shared 
outputs) 
 
Perfect competition and 
perfect information 
market competition 
(Clifton, 1977) 
Mutual benevolence 
and early signaling 
create cooperative 
learning gains (Axelrod, 
1984) 
Tit-for-tat strategies 
(Axelrod, 1984) and 
commensalism (Astley 
& Fombrun, 1983) 
AOAL 
Asymmetric Open 
Adverse Learning 
 (Both parties need to 
openly learn in a mutually 
adverse situation) 
Individual adaptation to 
maintain learning 
despite adversity 
(Skinner, 1968; Bence, 
1986; Menec et al. 
1995). Burden of 
antagonistic learning is 
beard by subject. 
Use of signaling to 
reduce uncertainty in 
adverse selection 
(Stigler, 1961; Akerlof, 
1970; Spence, 1973) 
while balancing 
discretionary attention 
and conformity (Ocasio, 
1997) 
Contingent altruism 
when cooperation is 
expensive (Hammond 
& Axelrod, 2006) and 
Lorenz (1966)’s 
redirected activity, e.g. 
“taking a hint” 
(Schelling, 1960). 
NAOL 
Non-Adverse 
Obfuscated Learning 
(One party is learning 
without disclosure with a 
non aggressive purpose) 
Use of industry jargon 
to preserve discretion 
(Spender, 1989) and 
obfuscation for 
selective filtering of 
audiences (Linsley and 
al., 2007) 
Cooperation without 
direct or readable 
reciprocity (Riolo et al. 
2001). Obfuscation is 
used to prevent 
opportunistic behavior 
(Larsson et al., 1998) 
Obfuscation is used to 
maintain causal 
ambiguity (Lippman 
and Rumelt, 1982) in 
sharing sensitive 
components of a 
cooperative system 
(e.g. olive tree growing; 
Foxhall, 2007). 
COAL 
Competitive Obfuscated 
Adverse Learning 
(One party engages in 
parasitic adverse non-
disclosed learning) 
Obfuscated learning 
has a purpose of 
cunning (Detienne and 
Vernant, 1991) or 
“parasitism” (Astley & 
Fombrun, 1983). 
Search for an “optimal 
obfuscation” (Kono, 
2006) allowing 
cooperation without 
compromising strategic 
independence. 
Obfuscation is used to 
disguise and 
antagonistic behavior 
within a cooperative 
ecosystem. Limit is 
tolerance to 
obfuscation. 
Table 1: A proposed typology of learning strategies 
 
Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to explore different “learning strategies” that can 
make coopetition possible and profitable for partners. Our inquiry started examining 
the corrective behaviors (generosity, contrition, signaling of good faith, signaling of 
conventions, etc) that are deployed by coopetitive partners to weather the ambiguities 
and tensions of paradoxical simultaneous cooperation and competition. We learned 
from game theory (Axelrod, 1984) that appropriate signaling can induce partners in 
maintaining a paradoxical agreement, and eventually for one of those partners to win 
it over. In a second step, we examined the role of knowledge within the coopetitive 
interaction. Looking at classic works of biology (Hawley, 1950), etiology (Lorenz, 
1966), and economics (Akerlof, 1970), we hypothesized that discretion and 
transparency could be achieved simultaneously, thus diminishing the need for 
corrective signaling. We found in the telecommunication and media industry various 
examples of “obfuscated processes”, i.e. cooperative processes where meaning is 
concealed but authenticity and functionality preserved. We then synthesized these 
discoveries in four propositions of “generic” learning strategies that may be used to 
sustain, or win over, a coopetition.  
 
These propositions trigger many questions. First, the apparent paradox of competing 
and collaborating at the same time can be waived, as obfuscated learning does not 
threaten the balance of coopetitive agreements. Second, the use obfuscated learning 
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strategies can displace and distort situations that can be read, at first glance, as pure 
coopetitive archetypes. The case study of LastFM is exemplar: the firm is sourcing its 
customer base within the platform of its competitor, but then creates a totally different 
ecosystem based on discovery of “unknowns unknowns” (artists that were not 
knowledgeable from the user), yielding its profits from the discovery function. While 
the presence of LastFM within the ITunes platform seems symbiotic in its façade, it is 
indeed a rather antagonistic learning and strategy. Third, studies of coopetition 
generally assume that knowledge and learning possess the same ontology for both 
partners in a coopetitive agreement. This assumption over-emphasizes the paradox of 
the arrangement, overlooking the fact that coopetitive ecosystems can indeed develop 
a harmonious growth without hurting partners. Fourth, most studies of coopetition 
focus on the managerial skills that allow for a better management of the tension 
between competition and cooperation, while obfuscated learning strategies underline 
the role of economic and technological design in the sustainability of coopetitive 
economics.  
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